A supplier you’ve paid for years sends this month’s invoice. The amount is right. The PDF looks like every other one. A short note says their bank has changed, and could you use the new details from now on.
That note is how payment redirection fraud works. It’s also the easiest kind to stop. One phone call, on a number you already had, settles it before any money moves. This guide covers how the fake invoice reaches you, the check that stops it, a payment rule a small firm can keep, and what to do in the first hour if the money already went.
How common the fake supplier invoice is
The FBI files this under business email compromise, or BEC. Its own definition reads like a description of most small firms:
BEC is a scam targeting businesses or individuals working with suppliers and/or businesses regularly performing wire transfer payments.
That’s from the FBI’s 2025 IC3 Annual Report (checked October 4, 2026). The same report counts 24,768 BEC complaints in 2025, up from 21,442 in 2024. Reported losses for the year came to just over $3 billion.
Those are only the losses people reported. They’re spread across firms of every size. The point for a seven-person office is simple: you’re a normal target, and a normal check protects you.
Three ways a redirected invoice reaches you
The note asking you to pay somewhere new can come from three places. They look different on the screen, and that difference decides which checks help.
| Where it comes from | What you see | What can give it away |
|---|---|---|
| A lookalike address | Your supplier’s name, a domain one letter off, such as acme-supp1y.com | The spelling of the domain, read slowly |
| Your supplier’s real mailbox, taken over | The right address, often inside a real thread you’ve been on for weeks | Only the request itself |
| A reply-to swap | The right address in From, a different one when you hit reply | The address your reply is going to |
The middle row is the hard one. Somebody gets into the supplier’s email and reads it for a while. They learn when invoices go out and how the supplier writes. Then they send the next invoice themselves, from the real account. Every check on the sender passes, because the sender is real. This is the one place where checking the sender misleads you: it confirms the account and says nothing about who’s typing.
Reading the address, the link and the attachment is covered step by step in how to spot a phishing email. For a payment change, skip straight to the call. It works on all three rows.
What the request tends to say
The wording varies. The shape doesn’t. Most redirect emails carry some of these:
- New bank details, often with a reason like an audit, a merger or a new bank
- A deadline, such as a late fee or a supply hold if it isn’t paid today
- A reason the phone won’t work, like a contact who’s traveling or “in meetings all week”
- An updated invoice to replace one you already have, with only the bank section changed
- A request to keep it quick, or to send the confirmation to a new email address
- An account in a different name, city or country from the supplier you know
Any one of these is enough to stop and call. None of them proves fraud. Suppliers really do change banks. The call is how you find out which one you’re looking at, and it costs a few minutes either way.
The check that stops it before you pay
Call the supplier on a phone number you had before this email arrived. Use your vendor file, an old invoice, or their website reached by typing the address yourself. The number in the email belongs to whoever wrote the email.
The FBI’s advice, from a public service announcement dated September 11, 2024, is one line:
Use secondary channels and/or two-factor authentication to verify requests for changes in account information.
Nacha, the body that runs the rules for ACH payments in the US, says the same thing in its December 12, 2025, tips for businesses that send payments:
If a vendor calls to request a change to their routing and account information for future payments, use contact information contained within your organization’s internal database to contact the vendor via phone or email.
Both mean the confirmation travels a road the fraudster doesn’t control. On the call:
- Ask for the person you normally deal with. A stranger in their accounts team is fine, as long as you reached them on the number you already had.
- Ask whether they changed their bank details. Let them tell you. Don’t read the new details out first.
- Confirm the account and routing numbers digit by digit if they say yes.
- Write down who you spoke to, when, and on which number. Keep it with the vendor record.
- Tell them if they didn’t send it. Their mailbox may be in someone else’s hands, and their other customers are getting the same note.
A reply to the email confirms nothing. If the account is taken over, whoever took it is the one answering.
A payment rule your firm can keep
The call only protects you if it happens every time. In a small office, that means making it the rule rather than a judgment call. Here’s a version that fits on one card:
- Bank details change by phone only. Any new or changed payee account is confirmed by a call to a number already on file.
- Two people for a new account. One person enters the change, another approves the first payment to it.
- The record lives outside the inbox. Keep each supplier’s phone number and bank details in your accounting system or vendor file, never only in the email thread.
- A change waits a day. A new account gets a one-day hold before the first payment, which takes the heat out of “pay today.”
- Anyone can slow it down. That includes a request that seems to come from you, the owner. Say so out loud to your team.
If your firm pays suppliers by ACH through your bank, part of this is now in the rules. Nacha’s fraud monitoring requirement reached every non-consumer Originator, regardless of size, on June 22, 2026. It’s built around a defined term:
False Pretenses: the inducement of a payment by a Person misrepresenting (a) that Person’s identity, (b) that Person’s association with or authority to act on behalf of another Person, or (c) the ownership of an account to be credited.
A fake supplier invoice is exactly that. The rule asks Originators to have risk-based processes meant to catch such payments, and to review them at least once a year. A written payment-change rule like the one above is the kind of process it means. Your bank’s treasury or business banking team can tell you how it applies to your account and which tools they offer, such as dual approval inside online banking.
If the money already went
Plenty of careful firms have paid one of these. What happens in the next few hours matters more than how it happened, so start there.
- Call your bank now. Ask for the fraud team. Ask them to recall the payment and to send whatever indemnification paperwork they need.
- File a complaint at ic3.gov the same day, whatever the amount. Include the full transaction details: date, amount, both banks, and the account it went to.
- Call the real supplier on the number you already had. Tell them what happened. The invoice they actually sent is still unpaid, and their mailbox may be compromised.
- Keep the email. Don’t delete it or forward it around. Your bank, the FBI and your insurer may each want the original.
- Call your insurer, if you have cyber or crime coverage. Many policies have short notice windows.
- Check your own mailbox if the fake arrived as a reply in your own thread. Change your password from a fresh tab, sign out of every session, and look for forwarding rules you didn’t set.
The FBI’s 2025 report puts the urgency plainly:
If you discover a fraudulent transfer, time is of the essence. Immediately, contact your financial institution and request a recall of the funds along with any necessary indemnification documents.
Speed helps. In 2025, the IC3 Recovery Asset Team worked 3,900 incidents through what it calls the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. The team froze about $679 million, 58% of the money criminals tried to move in those cases, according to the same report. A freeze works best while the money is still sitting in the first account it reached.
Who carries the loss between you, your supplier and the banks depends on your contracts and the facts. That’s a question for your attorney and your insurer, once the recall call is made. If client money or client data was involved, what you owe the client is a separate question. For accounting firms, it’s covered in AI and client data for accountants.
When the fake invoice carries your name
The same trick runs the other way. Someone can send your clients an invoice that looks like yours, with their bank account on it. You won’t see it arrive. You’ll hear about it when a client says they’ve paid and you can’t find the money.
Two sentences close most of that gap:
- On every invoice: “Our bank details will never change by email. If you get a message saying they have, call us on the number you already have.”
- In your engagement letter or welcome email: the same line, plus the phone number to use.
If a client tells you they got one, treat it as a sign that your mailbox or theirs may be compromised. The FTC’s guidance for small businesses on email imposters, posted December 7, 2018, says to report it to “local law enforcement, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at IC3.gov, and the FTC,” and to tell your customers as soon as possible. A client whose own account was taken over is its own job, covered in when a client’s email is taken over.
What Point sees, and what stays your call
Mail that looks risky or malicious lands in a set-aside pile, away from your feed. It’s there when you have a moment to look. A lookalike domain is a new address, so its mail arrives as a sender Point doesn’t recognize. That mail waits at the door, and Point doesn’t act on what it says.
Mail from your supplier’s real, taken-over account is different. It comes from an address you know, in a thread you know. No filter can tell you who was typing. So the call stays yours, and that’s the right place for it.
Point can help you remember to make it. You can set a watch in one sentence, like “when a supplier writes about new bank details, make me a task to call them on the number on file.” When that email lands, Point lines up the task. By default it waits for your go. How Point keeps hostile mail away from its own reading is explained in keeping suspicious mail away from the AI. Watches, briefings and drafting are all on the benefits page, and Point’s home page shows a working day with them.
Common questions
What is payment redirection fraud?
It’s an email that gets you to pay a real bill into the wrong account. It usually looks like an invoice or a bank-change note from a supplier you already pay. The money goes to the fraudster, and the real invoice stays unpaid.
How do I check whether a supplier really changed its bank details?
Call the supplier on a number you had before the email arrived, from your vendor file or an old invoice. Ask whether they changed their details before you mention the new ones. Then confirm the account and routing numbers digit by digit.
Can I reply to the email to confirm the change?
No. If the supplier’s mailbox has been taken over, the person reading your reply is the fraudster. Confirmation has to travel by a different road, which in practice means calling the supplier on the number in your own records.
Can a bank get the money back after a fake invoice is paid?
Sometimes, and speed decides it. Call your bank’s fraud team and ask for a recall, then file at ic3.gov the same day. In 2025, the FBI’s Recovery Asset Team froze 58% of the attempted theft in the incidents it worked.
Who pays if we sent money to the wrong account?
It depends on your contracts, your bank agreement and what each side did. Make the recall call first. Then take the question to your attorney and, if you have one, your cyber or crime insurer.
Does the Nacha 2026 rule apply to a small firm?
If your firm sends ACH payments to suppliers through your bank, Nacha treats you as a non-consumer Originator. Since June 22, 2026, that’s in scope regardless of size. Your bank can tell you what it expects from you and which controls it provides.