Who has access to your email? You do, and usually a few other things you let in and then forgot. Apps you said yes to. Phones you stopped using. A colleague you once gave access to. A rule that sends copies somewhere.
On Thursday night, Maya Okafor found fourteen of them on her own account. Her firm does bookkeeping and tax work for small businesses around Columbus, with six people on staff. Her account was broken into eleven days earlier with a reused password. By Thursday evening the firm signed in with passkeys, and she trusted the front door again. The fourteen were what was already inside.
This part of Point’s series is her Friday. It covers the four kinds of key a mailbox hands out, how to find each one, and what Maya kept. If you’ve just changed a password after a scare, you’ve done the right first thing. This is the list that comes next.
What a new password leaves open
Maya changed her password on Tuesday and signed out of every device. She assumed that locked everyone out. It locked out most of them.
Here’s the one mistake worth stopping for. A password change shuts out anyone who’s signing in with the password. It doesn’t always shut out what you’ve already let in.
Google’s own developer documentation shows where the line falls. It lists the reasons an app’s long-term access stops working, and one of them is narrow:
The user changed passwords and the refresh token contains Gmail scopes.
In plain terms, Tuesday’s new password cut off every app that could read Maya’s mail. Apps with access to her calendar, contacts or files kept going. Google also revokes app passwords when the main password changes. People you’ve made delegates keep their access, because they sign in as themselves. So do forwarding rules, which run inside the account.
So there are four places to look, and each one holds a different kind of key.
- Apps. Anything you’ve connected to your account, from a sign-in button to a tool that reads your inbox.
- Devices. Phones, laptops and tablets that are still signed in.
- People. Delegates, shared passwords and old accounts that still have a way in.
- Rules. Filters and forwarding that copy your mail somewhere else.
Fourteen apps sorted by what they could reach
Maya started at 8:00 with coffee and the list from Google’s Security Checkup. She didn’t try to remember each app. She asked one question of each one. What can it reach?
Google sorts the answer into three levels on its help page about third-party access. Some apps get only your name and email address. Some can view and copy data, like your contacts. Some can manage data, which Google spells out as the power to “edit, upload, create, or delete data.”
That turned fourteen names into four groups.
| What the apps could reach | How many | What they were | What Maya kept |
|---|---|---|---|
| Her name and address, to sign in | 7 | A webinar tool, two conference sites, a survey tool, a continuing-education site, a parking app, a stock-photo site | The webinar tool, the education site and the parking app |
| Her calendar | 2 | The booking link she uses every day, and a scheduling tool she’d tried once | The booking link |
| Her contacts or files | 3 | The firm’s e-signature service, a client-database trial from 2022, and an app called “Contact Sync” | The e-signature service |
| Her mail | 2 | An email-tracking extension from 2021, and the firm’s tax software | The tax software |
Six stayed and eight went. Most of the eight were harmless. Each was just a door she no longer used.
Two details made the morning worth it.
The tax software had stopped working on Tuesday. Wednesday morning it asked to be let back in, and Maya said yes. That was the password change doing its job on the apps that read mail. The tracking extension never asked again, because nobody used it anymore. It had lost its access on Tuesday anyway. Now it was gone from the list too.
Contact Sync was the one she couldn’t place. It could see and copy her contacts. That meant every client’s name, email address and phone number. She didn’t remember adding it. It might have been her, years ago. It might have been whoever signed in that Saturday. She couldn’t tell from the list, and she decided it didn’t matter. She removed it.
Removing an app stops what it can take next. It doesn’t undo what it’s already taken. Google’s page says so directly:
You may need to contact the developer of the app to request that they delete the data they already have.
Maya looked for the developer. She found a website with no contact address. So she treated the client list as out in the world. That changed nothing she’d do today. It changed what she’d watch for from now on.
The seven sign-in apps were different. Deleting a “Sign in with Google” link only stops the shortcut. Google’s page on linked apps notes that it “doesn’t delete your data on the app.” The four she dropped still held an account with her name on it. She wrote them on the list from Thursday, the one of everything her address unlocks.
The laptop in Ben’s closet
At 9:30 Maya sent the other five a short message. Open your own list, sort it the same way, and bring anything you can’t place to Priya.
Priya took the devices next. Google shows every computer, phone and tablet where an account “is or was signed in” recently. Each person scrolled their own.
Most of what turned up was ordinary.
- Ben’s old laptop was still signed in. He’d replaced it in the spring and it was in a closet at home.
- Ana’s tablet had her work mail on it. Her daughter used it for homework.
- A browser on the front-desk computer was signed in as Jess. She’d checked her mail there once in March.
Each one got signed out. None of them was a break-in. Each was a way in that nobody was watching.
Priya and Maya are the firm’s two admins, so Priya learned one more control. If someone loses a phone, an admin can sign them out everywhere at once. Google’s admin help calls it resetting sign-in cookies:
This signs the user out of their Google Account (including any Google Workspace applications) across all devices and browsers.
The same page shows the admins each person’s connected apps. It adds a caution that explained Wednesday’s tax-software prompt from the other side. When an admin removes an app, “once a user signs into the app again, data access is restored.” Removing an app works once. If the firm wants an app to stay out, the admin has to block it.
So Priya did. The firm’s Workspace settings let an admin mark apps as trusted, limited or blocked. Contact Sync went on the blocked list for everyone.
One password between three people
This was the debt from Thursday. The firm’s info@ address had one password, and three people knew it. A passkey belongs to one person. A shared password belongs to whoever has heard it.
The fix was to stop it being an account at all. Google suggests a different shape for exactly this in its Workspace help:
If your team needs a shared mailbox, such as for technical support or customer service, you can use a Google group as a collaborative inbox.
Priya made info@ a group. Jess, Ben and Priya became its members. Each of them now reads info@ mail with their own sign-in, behind their own passkey. Nobody holds a password for info@, because there isn’t one.
Priya found one more key under the old account. The office copier sent scans out through info@ using an app password. Google describes each one as “a 16-digit passcode” for an older app or device. Its help page says they “aren’t recommended and are unnecessary in most cases.” Changing info@ into a group retired it. The copier now sends scans to each person’s own address.
The delegate nobody removed
Maya’s own account had one more name in it. Rachel had been the firm’s admin assistant until 2023. For two years she’d sorted Maya’s inbox as a delegate.
Google’s delegation page puts the power plainly:
A delegate is someone who can read, send, and delete emails in your account for you.
When Rachel left, someone changed her password. Nobody closed her account, and nobody removed her from Maya’s mailbox. A delegate signs in as themselves, so Maya’s new password on Tuesday hadn’t touched it.
There was nothing to suggest Rachel had ever used it. That wasn’t the point. Anyone who got into Rachel’s old account, which still had only that changed password, could have read Maya’s mail as easily as Maya could.
Priya removed the delegate and suspended Rachel’s account. Then she checked the firm’s list of accounts against the people who actually worked there. One more turned up: a seasonal preparer from last tax season, still active. That account was suspended too.
Rules that send your mail somewhere else
Maya had deleted the attacker’s forwarding rule on Tuesday. On Friday, everyone looked at their own.
Five people had nothing surprising. Tom had a forward to his personal Gmail. He’d set it up for a vacation in 2024 and forgotten it. For two years, every client email he received had also landed in a personal inbox with a weaker sign-in.
Tom deleted it. Then Priya made the choice for the firm. Workspace lets each person forward their own mail unless an admin says otherwise. Google’s admin page is short about it:
It’s on by default. When this setting is off, the forwarding option isn’t available in Gmail settings.
Priya turned it off. Google’s page doesn’t say whether that also stops forwards that already exist. That’s why everyone checked by hand first.
If your firm is on Microsoft 365, this one may already be done. Microsoft changed its default in 2021, so automatic forwarding outside the organization is off for most firms unless someone switched it back on. The other three lists exist there too, under different names.
Why a tax practice owes this list anyway
Maya didn’t do Friday because a rule told her to. She was glad to find out afterward that one does.
The FTC Safeguards Rule covers a long list of financial businesses. The FTC’s guide to the rule names “tax preparation firms” among them. Here’s what 16 CFR 314.4(c)(1) asks for:
Implementing and periodically reviewing access controls, including technical and, as appropriate, physical controls to: (i) Authenticate and permit access only to authorized users to protect against the unauthorized acquisition of customer information; and (ii) Limit authorized users’ access only to customer information that they need to perform their duties and functions
In practice, it means knowing who can open client information and taking back access nobody needs. The FTC’s guide puts it in owner’s terms: “reconsider on a regular basis whether they still have a legitimate business need for it.” A former assistant’s delegate access, an app nobody could name and a two-year-old forward are exactly what that review is meant to catch.
Friday at 4:40
By the afternoon, Maya’s account looked like this:
- Six apps, each one she could name. Contact Sync is blocked for the whole firm.
- Every device on every list is in someone’s hands.
- No delegates on her account, and no accounts for people who’ve left.
- No forwarding anywhere in the firm, and no way to turn it back on without an admin.
- info@ is a group, read by three people with their own passkeys.
Everything that could open the mailbox now belonged to someone at the firm, and each of them signed in for themselves.
At 4:40 an email came in from Dale Huang. He was the client whose reply had started all this on Tuesday. He’d been patient all week, and he had one question.
“Glad things are sorted. The bank needs last year’s return for the lease by Monday. Is it safe to just email it now, or should we do it some other way?”
Maya read it twice. All week the firm had been working on who could get in. Dale was asking about what goes out. She left his email open on her screen and went to find out how far the padlock goes once a message leaves the firm.