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One email for everything, and the account underneath it

Part 03 of 7

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Most firms use one email for everything, and Maya Okafor’s six-person practice is typical. At 8:00 on Thursday, six phones sat face up on the conference table. Priya had brought coffee and a legal pad. Maya had brought Tuesday’s timeline: one sign-in, eleven days of forwarding, one message to a client.

The bank, the payroll service, the tax software and the domain the firm’s address lives on all send their password resets to it. So every one of those accounts rests on how you sign in to that one. This part of the series is the morning Maya’s firm looked at how each of them actually signed in. It covers what they found, what a passkey does that a text code doesn’t, and how to find everything your email is linked to.

If you’ve landed here after a scare of your own, you’re in good company. Most small firms do this only after a morning like Maya’s. Maya’s firm did most of it in a day.

This series comes from Point (what Point does), and everything on this page works with whichever app you use.

How six people actually signed in

Maya went around the table and asked one question. When you sign in to your work email on a new computer, what happens after the password?

Everyone answered from memory. That was the useful part.

WhoWhat came after the passwordWhat else turned up
Maya, ownerNothingHer recovery address was a personal account she hadn’t opened in years
Priya, office managerA text message codeHer recovery phone was the office line, which rolls to the front desk
Tom, senior bookkeeperA six-digit code from an authenticator appHis email password was also his payroll-portal password
Ana, tax preparerA “Yes, it’s me” prompt on her phoneShe admitted she taps Yes without reading it
Ben, bookkeeperA text message codeHis password lived in a sticky note under his keyboard
Jess, part-time preparerA text message codeShe and two others shared the password to the firm’s info@ mailbox

Five of the six had a second step. Maya noticed that the room relaxed when they heard that. Then she read out the next part of what she’d learned on Tuesday night.

Where a text code stops

A second step makes a stolen password much less useful. It’s still worth knowing which kind you have, because each one holds up differently.

The person who used Maya’s password had it from an old breach. Had she been using text codes, they’d have needed more. The common way to get more is to ask for it. A fake sign-in page collects the password, then asks for the code, then passes both to the real page within seconds. CISA’s fact sheet on implementing phishing-resistant MFA, published in October 2022, describes exactly this:

The user submits their username, password, as well as the 6-digit code from their mobile phone’s authenticator app.

That’s the gap. A code is something you read and type. Anything you can type, you can type into the wrong page. NIST’s current guidance on sign-in, SP 800-63B Revision 4, puts the rule plainly:

Authenticators that involve the manual entry of an authenticator output (e.g., out-of-band and OTP authenticators) SHALL NOT be considered phishing-resistant because the manual entry does not bind the authenticator output to the specific session.

In plain terms, a code works on whatever page it’s typed into. A passkey or a hardware security key checks the real site’s address before it answers. A lookalike page gets silence. CISA’s fact sheet says that this kind of sign-in is the one to aim for:

The only widely available phishing-resistant authentication is FIDO/WebAuthn authentication.

FIDO and WebAuthn are the standards underneath passkeys and security keys. On text and voice codes, the same fact sheet says they “should only be used as a last resort MFA option.”

Codes still help. CISA also says “any form of MFA is better than no MFA.” Each kind simply stops at a different point. Here’s how the room’s sign-ins sorted out, weakest first, in roughly the order CISA’s table uses.

  • A password alone. Whoever has it is in. That was Maya’s account on Saturday.
  • A text or voice code. It can be phished, and it can be taken by someone who talks a phone carrier into moving your number.
  • A phone prompt. It’s quick, and it’s only as good as the moment you tap it. Someone holding your password can send prompts until one gets a tired Yes. Ana’s honest answer was the whole risk.
  • An authenticator app code. It can’t be moved with your number, but it can still be typed into a fake page.
  • A passkey or a security key. It answers only the real site.

A more secure email login, starting with Maya’s

Maya went first, as she’d said she would. Her account was the one that had been opened, and she was one of two people who could reset everyone else’s.

She made a passkey on her phone. Signing in on her laptop now meant unlocking her phone with her face, the way she unlocks it fifty times a day. There’s one step, and it’s the one she already knew. Google describes the difference this way on its passkey help page:

Unlike passwords, passkeys can’t be shared, copied, written down, or accidentally given to someone else. This makes them more secure against phishing.

Google has offered passkeys as the default sign-in for personal accounts since October 10, 2023. Work accounts on Google Workspace and Microsoft 365 support them too. The firm’s mail ran on Workspace.

Then she registered two hardware security keys. These are small USB or tap-to-phone keys that do the same job as a passkey without needing the phone. One went on her key ring. The other went in the office safe, next to a printed sheet of backup codes. Priya did the same. They’re the two admin accounts, and an admin account is the one an attacker most wants, because it can reset all the others.

The spare key matters more than it sounds. A sign-in that resists phishing is also one you can lock yourself out of. Two keys and a sheet of backup codes in a known place is what makes the strong lock safe to live with.

By 9:15 all six had a passkey on their phones. Priya then changed the firm’s Workspace setting so that every account must use a passkey or a security key. Google’s admin documentation calls this enforcement option “Only security key,” and passkeys count under it. Text codes stopped being an option for anyone at the firm. Microsoft 365 has its own way to require the same thing.

The password still matters, a little less

With a passkey in front, the password becomes a backup key. Most accounts still accept it as a fallback, so it still counts.

So the room made one more change. Every password became long, unique and kept in a password manager, so the manager remembers it. Tom’s payroll password stopped matching his email password that morning. Ben’s sticky note went in the shredder.

NIST’s revision is a good guide to what “long” means and what matters. It sets a 15-character minimum for a password used on its own. It also asks sites to stop forcing odd symbols and scheduled changes, and to check new passwords against lists of breached ones. On password managers, it’s direct:

Verifiers SHALL allow the use of password managers and autofill functionality.

That rule is written for the sites. It tells you something useful anyway. The standard assumes you’re using a password manager.

The account under the account

Maya’s recovery address was the surprise of the morning.

Years ago she’d set a personal address as the backup for the firm account. It still belonged to her. That’s what she’d checked on Tuesday. The next question was how that address signed in. It had a password from 2017 and nothing after it.

A recovery address is a side door. If you lose access, the provider sends a way back in to it. Anyone who controls it can ask for the same thing. So the firm account was exactly as strong as an old personal inbox Maya had forgotten.

Google’s recovery help page gives two pieces of guidance that fit this.

  • For the recovery email: “Choose an email address you use regularly but not the one you use to sign in to your Google Account.”
  • For the recovery phone: “a mobile phone that gets text messages, belongs only to you, and that you use regularly and keep with you.”

Maya’s old address failed the first. Priya’s office line failed the second. Anyone on the front desk could have read a recovery code out loud.

Both were fixed before lunch. Maya gave her personal address the same treatment as the work one: a new password and a passkey. Priya moved her recovery number to her own cell. The same page notes that a changed recovery phone “may take up to 7 days” to take effect. So Priya made the change that morning rather than putting it on the list for next week.

While they were in the settings, everyone checked one more thing. Google sends security alerts by phone or email when it sees something like a new-device sign-in. Its security alerts page lists the first reason as to “detect important actions in your account, like if someone signs in on a new device.” Those alerts also go to the recovery address. Maya’s had been going to the forgotten inbox. On that Saturday, the warning had arrived. It sat unread for eleven days.

Everything your email is linked to

After lunch Priya asked the question that gives this part its name. If the email is the key to everything else, what is “everything else”?

The firm had never made that list. Few people have. Priya built one for Maya’s address in about an hour, using three sources.

  1. The mailbox itself. She searched it for phrases every site sends once: “verify your email,” “welcome to,” “reset your password” and “your account.” Each hit was an account somewhere with Maya’s address on it.
  2. The password manager. Once everyone had moved their saved passwords in, it was the cleanest list of where each person actually signed in.
  3. Breach lists. Have I Been Pwned, a free service run by the security researcher Troy Hunt since 2013, shows which known breaches an address appears in. Maya’s appeared in four. The conference site from Tuesday was one of them.

The list ran to just over ninety accounts. Most were harmless. A handful mattered a great deal.

  • The domain registrar. Whoever can reset the registrar account can move the firm’s domain. With it goes the address on every invoice the firm has sent.
  • The firm’s bank and payroll service. Both sent reset links to Maya’s address.
  • The phone carrier. This is the account a stranger would use to move a number, and with it any text codes.
  • The accounting and tax software. Each held client records and sent password resets to the same inbox.

Each of those got a passkey where the site offered one, and a unique password and app code where it didn’t. The registrar went first.

Should one email hold everything?

For most firms it already does. Unpicking ninety accounts is slow work. Spreading them across five addresses gives you five inboxes to secure instead of one.

What you can do is make the one address very hard to get into, which is the morning above. Then you can stop adding to it. Maya now signs up for conferences and newsletters with a separate alias. If one of those sites loses its list again, the address that leaks is a spare one, and the bank’s is safe. If you’d like an address you can carry between providers, keeping your address, history and contacts covers how that works.

What the conference room left with

By 5:00 on Thursday, the firm had changed more than it had on any day in years. The provider, the address and the app all stayed the same.

  • Every account signs in with a passkey or a security key. Text codes are switched off for the whole firm.
  • The two admin accounts each have two keys. One is on a key ring and one is in the safe, with backup codes.
  • Every password is long, unique and in a password manager.
  • Every recovery address and phone belongs to its owner and is itself protected.
  • Maya has a list of what her address unlocks, with the five accounts that matter most already hardened.

Two things were left for Friday.

The first was Jess’s answer. The info@ mailbox had one password, known to three people. A passkey belongs to one person. That mailbox needs its own owner and its own way of being shared.

The second turned up when Maya ran Google’s Security Checkup one last time before she went home. The sign-ins were all hers now. Below them, under third-party access, sat a number she hadn’t looked at on Tuesday: fourteen apps and services still connected to her account. Some she recognized. Some she couldn’t place. Each one had been let in at some point. The passkey settled how she signs in. Who she’d already let in was a separate list.

She left the fourteen on her screen for Friday, when the firm would sort out who still has a key.

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