When people say email is encrypted, they mean one of three things. The message was sealed on the trip between servers. Or it’s sealed while it sits on the provider’s disks. Or the message itself is sealed, so only the sender and the recipient can open it. Those are the three kinds of email encryption: in transit, at rest and end to end.
If your firm is on Gmail or Microsoft 365, you already have the first two. You didn’t switch anything on. The third is the one people usually picture when they hear “encrypted,” and it’s the one you’d have to choose.
This page explains what each kind seals, who holds the key and which standard sits underneath. Then it shows how to tell which kind a message had.
The three kinds of email encryption, side by side
| In transit | At rest | End to end | |
|---|---|---|---|
| What it seals | The connection between two mail servers | Stored mail on the provider’s disks | The message itself, wherever it goes |
| Who holds the key | The two servers, for that one connection | The provider | The sender and the recipient |
| Who can read the message | The provider at each end | The provider, and anyone who signs in as you | The sender and the recipient |
| The standard underneath | TLS, through STARTTLS | The provider’s own disk encryption | S/MIME or OpenPGP |
| On Gmail and Microsoft 365 | On by default | On by default | Something you add |
Each column answers a different worry. The rest of this page takes them one at a time.
In transit, on the trip between servers
An email doesn’t travel in one jump. It goes from your app to your provider, from your provider to the recipient’s provider, and from there to the recipient’s phone. Encryption in transit seals each of those hops while the message crosses it.
The standard is TLS, the same technology behind the padlock in a web browser. Mail servers switch it on with a command called STARTTLS. It was defined in RFC 3207, published in February 2002:
This document describes an extension to the SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) service that allows an SMTP server and client to use TLS (Transport Layer Security) to provide private, authenticated communication over the Internet.
In plain terms, two servers agree to talk in code before the message passes between them.
Google’s Gmail Help (checked October 4, 2026) puts the default in one line: “All Gmail messages use TLS automatically.” Microsoft 365 does the same for its own mail.
The part that depends on the other end
TLS needs both servers to take part. Google says so on its encryption help page (checked October 4, 2026): “For TLS to work, the email providers for both the sender and recipient must use TLS.” If the other server can’t, most mail goes anyway, unencrypted. That’s called opportunistic TLS. It’s encryption when it’s available.
There’s a second gap. The servers agree to encrypt in the open, before the code starts. Someone in the middle can quietly delete the offer. RFC 3207 described this in 2002:
A man-in-the-middle attack can be launched by deleting the “250 STARTTLS” response from the server.
The two servers then fall back to plain text, and neither one notices.
Closing the gap with MTA-STS
A newer standard lets a domain say “only deliver to me encrypted.” It’s called MTA-STS, from RFC 8461, published in September 2018. A domain publishes a policy. A sending server that honors it refuses to deliver unless the connection is encrypted and the certificate checks out.
Gmail honors these policies when it sends. Google’s admin help on MTA-STS (checked October 4, 2026) says:
Gmail messages from your domain comply with MTA-STS when sent to external servers with an MTA-STS policy in enforced mode.
The same page covers a companion setting, TLS reporting. It asks other mail servers to send your domain daily reports about their connections, so failures show up instead of passing silently.
For a small firm, this lives with whoever manages your domain’s records. It sits alongside the SPF, DKIM and DMARC records covered in your own domain, and what makes it secure. Ask them whether your domain publishes an MTA-STS policy in enforced mode. It’s a short question, and the answer is yes or no.
What it leaves open
Once the message lands, encryption in transit is finished. The message sits readable in your sent folder, in the recipient’s inbox and on their phone. The lock protected the trip. It says nothing about the mailbox at either end. That’s the one misreading on this page worth guarding against, because “it’s encrypted” often stops the question right there. The full story of that gap, worked through one tax firm’s weekend, is in what the email padlock means, and how far it goes.
How to see which kind a message had
Gmail tells you for each message. Open it, then tap Show details under the sender. Google’s help page lists what you’ll see on the security line:
- Standard encryption (TLS) means the trip was sealed.
- Enhanced encryption (S/MIME) means the message itself was sealed.
- No encryption supported means it crossed at least part of the way in plain text.
The icons beside the sender carry the same information. A gray lock, green lock, blue shield and red open lock each mean something different. They’re explained in encrypted email, and what an AI assistant cannot read.
At rest on the provider’s disks
Most of a message’s life is spent sitting still. Encryption at rest seals it there, on the provider’s storage.
Both big providers do this for everyone. Google’s February 28, 2023 Workspace announcement says “Workspace already encrypts data at rest and in transit by using secure-by-design cryptographic libraries.” Microsoft’s Customer Key documentation (checked October 4, 2026) says the same for Microsoft 365:
Your Microsoft 365 data is always encrypted at rest using BitLocker and Distributed Key Manager (DKM).
The same page says Exchange mailboxes use “Microsoft-managed keys” by default.
That detail is the whole story of this kind. The provider holds the key. It has to, because it opens your mail every time you sign in. So encryption at rest protects your mail from someone who walks out of a data center with a disk. It doesn’t protect it from the provider. It doesn’t protect it from anyone who signs in as you, either.
Some services change who holds that key. Microsoft lets large customers bring their own. Proton and Tuta store mail with a key the provider can’t use. Those arrangements, and what each lets the provider reach, are set out in secure cloud email, and where your mail actually sits.
End to end, from sender to recipient
End-to-end encryption seals the message before it leaves the sender. It stays sealed on every server and every disk along the way. Only the recipient’s key opens it.
Every kind of end-to-end email works on the same idea. Each person has two keys. The public key is shared freely, and anyone can use it to seal a message to you. The private key stays with you, and only it can open what was sealed. The two standards differ mainly in who vouches that a public key really belongs to the person named on it.
S/MIME
S/MIME uses certificates issued by a certificate authority, much like a website’s. The current version is defined in RFC 8551, published in April 2019:
Digital signatures provide authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation with proof of origin. Encryption provides data confidentiality.
So S/MIME does two jobs. The signature proves who sent the message and that nobody changed it. The encryption keeps it private. NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1, the federal guidance on trustworthy email, names S/MIME for message content: “Recommendations for email content security include the encryption and authentication of message content using S/MIME.”
S/MIME is built into Outlook and Apple Mail. It suits a counterpart with an IT department, because both sides need certificates before the first sealed message.
OpenPGP
PGP is the other standard. Its current form is OpenPGP, RFC 9580, published in July 2024. There’s no certificate authority. People confirm each other’s keys themselves. That puts you in full control, and asks the same of everyone you write to.
Proton and similar services use OpenPGP underneath and handle the keys for you. Mail between two people on the same service is end to end with no setup at all.
Google’s version for Workspace
Google offers end-to-end encryption on Workspace as client-side encryption. Its admin documentation (checked October 4, 2026) describes it as “end-to-end encryption that Google servers and third parties can’t decrypt.” It’s available on Frontline Plus, Enterprise Plus, Education Standard and Education Plus. Your organization runs the keys, through an outside key service.
What end to end still shows
The sealed part is the body and the attachments. The envelope travels in the open, because servers need it to deliver the mail. That’s who wrote to whom and when. On most services it’s the subject line too. Proton’s encryption overview (checked October 4, 2026) is direct about its own service:
Subject lines, recipient email addresses, and sender email addresses are encrypted, but not end-to-end encrypted.
So write subject lines as if they’ll be read. “Documents for Thursday” travels safely. “Smith divorce, bank statements” doesn’t.
When the “encrypt” button does something else
Many products offer an encrypt button that works differently. The message waits on the provider’s server, and the recipient gets a link and a code. Microsoft Purview Message Encryption and Gmail confidential mode both work this way. That’s real protection on the trip and on the disk. The provider still holds the key, though, and the content never lands in the recipient’s mailbox. What that changes for your search, your archive and any assistant you use is in encrypted email, and what an AI assistant cannot read.
Which kind answers which worry
Match the kind to what you’re actually protecting against.
- Someone reading mail on the network. Encryption in transit handles this, and you already have it. An enforced MTA-STS policy closes the downgrade gap.
- A stolen disk or a breach inside the provider’s storage. Encryption at rest handles this, and you already have it too.
- The provider itself, or a legal demand made to the provider. Only end-to-end encryption, or a mailbox whose key the provider can’t use, keeps the body out of reach.
- A recipient forwarding the message. None of the three stops this. A sealed message is readable once it’s opened.
- A phished password or an infected laptop. None of the three helps here. Whoever has your account or your device has your keys.
That last item is where most small firms actually get hurt. How the account protections compare with the encryption ones is in what secure email means, and what it protects.
When a client asks whether your email is encrypted
It’s a fair question, and there’s an honest one-line answer. For a firm on Gmail or Microsoft 365, it goes something like this:
Our email is encrypted in transit and at rest by our provider. For anything sensitive, we use [your end-to-end method or portal] instead.
That’s accurate, and it tells the client what to expect when a document matters. If you don’t have a second method yet, encryption a small firm can run covers the options that fit a firm your size. For what a client sees on their side when you send encrypted mail, see secure email for your business.
Point and the encryption you already have
Point doesn’t encrypt mail or change how your provider stores it. Point connects through the sign-in you approve with Google or Microsoft. It never needs your email password. Your mail keeps the transit and at-rest encryption your provider gives it.
Point reads what your mailbox holds. A message sealed end to end, or waiting behind a portal link, is outside your mailbox, so it’s outside Point’s reach too. Where your mail goes when Point reads it is in email security and privacy. What Point does with it each day is on the benefits page.
Common questions
Is email encrypted by default?
On Gmail and Microsoft 365, yes, in two of the three senses. Mail is encrypted in transit when the other server supports TLS, and it’s encrypted at rest on the provider’s disks. It isn’t end-to-end encrypted by default. The provider can read it, and so can the recipient’s provider once it arrives.
Is TLS the same as end-to-end encryption?
No. TLS seals each hop between servers, and the message is readable at every stop. End-to-end encryption seals the message itself, so only the sender and the recipient can open it.
What’s the difference between S/MIME and PGP?
Both seal the message with the recipient’s public key. S/MIME relies on certificates from a certificate authority and is built into Outlook and Apple Mail. PGP has no central authority, so people confirm each other’s keys themselves. Services like Proton use OpenPGP and manage the keys for you.
Does encryption hide the subject line?
Usually not. The sender, recipients and date travel in the open so servers can deliver the mail. Many end-to-end services leave the subject outside the sealed part too. Keep sensitive detail out of the subject.
Is encryption at rest enough for HIPAA?
The HIPAA Security Rule treats encryption as one safeguard among several, and the right setup depends on how protected health information moves through your firm. What the rule asks of email, and the business associate agreement that goes with it, is covered in secure email for your business.
Which kind of encryption does a small firm need?
The first two come with your provider. Most firms add end-to-end protection only for the messages that carry sensitive documents. Which providers do that best is in the most secure email, ranked honestly.