Maya read Priya’s three links at her kitchen table on Wednesday, before the office opened. Each list ranked the most secure email providers. Each one put Proton near the top, then Tuta, then a few names that were new to her. By the third list she’d stopped reading the rankings and started reading the columns.
Is there a way to make an email more secure? Yes, and for most small firms it starts with the account you already have. Switching to an encrypted service such as Proton or Tuta buys something real too. It protects a different thing. This part of the series, from Point, is the morning Maya worked out which thing she needed.
If you’re where she was, looking is a sensible thing to do. A scare makes the whole mailbox feel unsafe, and a new provider feels like a new start. It’s worth knowing exactly what the new start would cover before you pay for it.
What the padlock columns measure
Every list had the same columns. End-to-end encryption. Zero-access storage. Open-source code. Servers in Switzerland or Germany. Two-factor sign-in, usually with a tick for everyone.
Maya noticed what those columns have in common. Almost all of them protect your mail from two parties: the network it crosses, and the company that stores it. Proton puts its promise in one line:
Zero-access encryption means the service provider cannot access your data under any circumstances, not even when it is stored on their servers.
That’s from Proton’s own explanation of the encryption types. It’s a strong promise, and it’s about the provider.
Maya’s mail had been read by a stranger who signed in as her with a password from an old conference site. So the question for her morning was simple. Which of those columns would have stopped Saturday’s sign-in?
Which threats an encrypted provider covers
She made a short table on the back of an envelope. Priya typed it up later. It’s the most useful thing either of them wrote that week, so here it is.
| What she was worried about | Her Google account today | An encrypted provider such as Proton or Tuta |
|---|---|---|
| Someone reading mail as it crosses the internet | Covered by standard transport encryption | Covered |
| The provider reading stored mail | Google holds the keys to stored mail | Covered for mail at rest, by design |
| A legal order served on the provider for message content | Google can produce readable content | Stored content is encrypted to keys only you hold |
| Subject lines and who wrote to whom | Visible to Google | Proton leaves subject lines unencrypted; Tuta encrypts them |
| Someone who signs in with her password | Reads everything | Reads everything |
| A forwarding rule set by that person | Runs until someone finds it | Runs until someone finds it |
| A forged reply inside a real thread | Lands in a client’s inbox | Lands in a client’s inbox |
The first four rows are what the lists rank. The last three are Tuesday.
That’s the one distinction worth slowing down for. Encryption protects mail from people who lack your login. Someone who has it gets the same view you get. A person signed in as you is, as far as any provider can tell, you. Proton decrypts your mail for you when you sign in, and it would decrypt it for them too.
The subject-line row matters more than it looks. Proton says plainly that “subject lines in Proton Mail messages are not end-to-end encrypted to remain compliant with standards and ensure interoperability” (Proton). Tuta says it encrypts “the ‘subject’ as well as the names of the ‘sender’ and the recipient.” If the subject line of a message is itself the secret, that difference is the deciding one between the two.
Why are people ditching Gmail?
Priya’s next question was the one in half the comment threads under those lists. Isn’t everyone leaving Gmail anyway?
Some people are, for a reason that holds up. Google holds the keys to the mail it stores, which is how it can search your archive and show it on any device. Some owners simply want their client mail in fewer hands. That’s a values choice, and a fair one. The other reasons in those threads are older or shakier, and encrypted email, and what an AI assistant cannot read sorts out what each kind of protection really covers.
So switching does fix one real concern. It takes your stored mail out of reach of the company that stores it. Who can sign in stays exactly as it was.
What the move would have cost the firm
Maya did the arithmetic anyway. A real decision deserves real numbers, and she owed Priya more than “probably not.”
The firm’s mail ran on Google Workspace under its own domain. That part made a move easier than she’d feared. With your own domain, the address belongs to you rather than to the provider. Proton supports custom domains on paid plans, and the move points the domain’s MX records at Proton’s servers (Proton). Clients would keep writing to the same address. If your firm’s mail sits on a gmail.com or outlook.com address, the address doesn’t travel, and keeping your address, history and contacts covers what that means.
The real cost was what happened next, on the client’s side of every message.
- Most clients use other providers. Proton’s encryption runs end to end between Proton users. Mail to anyone else “isn’t end-to-end encrypted by default” once it arrives (Proton). Almost all of Maya’s clients use Gmail or Outlook.
- The encrypted option asks something of each client. To seal a message to an outside address, Proton uses a password-protected email. The client gets a notice, clicks through to the message, and types a password. The message expires after 28 days at most. A client can reply to it five times.
- Tuta works the same way for outsiders. An encrypted email to an external recipient needs a password, exchanged once (Tuta).
- The desktop apps change. Tuta doesn’t support IMAP, because “IMAP would require storing emails unencrypted on your local device” (Tuta). Proton connects desktop apps like Outlook and Apple Mail through a separate program called Proton Mail Bridge.
- Every connected tool starts over. The tax software, the scanner that emails PDFs, the calendar the front desk books from. Each one has to connect to the new provider again, if it can.
Then she thought about Dale. He’d have been one of the clients getting a link and a password. He was also the client a stranger had just written to from her address. The forged email had worked because it looked like every other message from her. A firm that starts sending clients links to click and passwords to type makes that kind of message look normal. It’s exactly the shape a phishing email copies.
When switching is worth it
All of that makes an encrypted provider a choice about a particular threat. It’s the right one when the threat is the provider itself, or what a provider can be made to hand over.
It earns its cost in a few situations.
- Your correspondents are on it too. A small group who all use Proton or Tuta get end-to-end encryption in every message, the way ordinary email feels.
- The stored archive is the risk. If a court order or a breach at your provider is a realistic worry, mail encrypted to keys only you hold is the strongest answer there is.
- The subject line or the contact list is the secret. Tuta encrypts both, which is rare.
- You’d simply rather a large company didn’t hold your mail. That’s a legitimate reason on its own. It’s worth being clear with yourself that it’s the reason.
It’s also worth knowing where that protection stops. In September 2021, Proton wrote about an order it received from Swiss authorities. It said that “if you are breaking Swiss law, a law-abiding company such as Proton Mail can be legally compelled to log your IP address” (Proton). The same post says its encryption can’t be bypassed by legal orders. Both can be true. The content stays sealed. Some facts about the person using it can still be collected.
For Maya’s firm, the threat was a stranger with her password. An encrypted provider would have given that stranger the same view of the same mail. It would also have handed every client a new routine just as she needed them to distrust anything new.
Making the email she had more secure
So the decision came out small and specific. Stay with the provider. Make the account a lot harder to get into, and find everyone who already had a way in.
Her plan for the week fit on the envelope’s other side: lock the sign-in, find every key still out there, and seal only the few messages that truly need it.
Thursday at 8:00
Maya replied to Priya at 8:20 with one line. “We’re staying. Can you get everyone in the conference room tomorrow at 8:00, with their phones?”
Priya wrote back a thumbs-up and a question. “Whose account first?”
Maya already knew. The one that had been opened on Saturday. Hers was the one account in the firm with only a password. So on Thursday she’d go first, and all six of them would watch her open up the account underneath her own address.